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CHAPTER I
DEFINING NATIONALISM

A majority of the studies concerning the European continent have
focused only upon the well-chronicled sagas left behind by specific countries.
Volumes have been published on the French Revolution, German Empires,
Italian Fascism, the Hapsburg Empire, and the rises and falls of each
individual nation. An increasingly popular euphemism is put forth in Chaos
Theory, wherein a butterfly beating its wings in Japan will alter the weather
in New York City. In science as in life, it is well known that a chain of events
can have a point of crisis that can magnify small changes.! From such a
perspective, a study focusing upon only one specific European Nation is
confined in its focus. Each event in Europe has historically set off chain
reactions, reverberating from nation to nation,

effe~ting

other courses of

events. Perhaps at no time has this been more evident than in modern-day
Europe, a conglomeration of different descents, languages, territories,
customs, traditions, religions, and nationalisms. The optimal approach for
testing hypotheses involving Europe, therefore, is a cross-sectional design in
which these norms vary just as they do on the continent itself. 2
In a multi-national study such as that being undertaken in this paper,

a "common denominator" must be used to assure accurate and equal
assessment of each subject -- a precisely-stated tool proves better than a dull

Ijames Gleick, Chaos:Making A New Life Science (New York: Penguin. 1988) 23.
2 Raymond M. Ouch and James L. Gibson, "'Putting Up with' Fascists in Western
Europe: A Comparitive, Cross-Level Analysis of Political Tolerance," The
Western Political Quarterly
55, March 1992: 238.

2
analogy.3 The nationalisms currently presenting themselves in the European
nations differ in numerous degrees which can only be measured with a high
precision tool of inquiry. The tool of inquiry which will be applied
throughout the mechanism of this paper will be a constant definition of
nationalism.
A clear, widely accepted definition of nationalism has traditionally
proven elusive. Nationalism has undergone changes just as nations or,
more specifically, each of its components has adopted a different appearance.
This does not,' however, mean that no scholar has succeeded in accurately
defining nationalism, but it is indicative of nationalism itself. Nationalism
is contingent upon the climate during a particular period, during which
several often unmeasurable factors contribute to the formation of a collective
mentality. The predominant nationalism of a time and place is thus
answerable to the factors which are given emphasis. at that particular time. It
is this relativism inherent in nationalism which helps it to elude man's
attempts at defining it ; when nationalism is traced from its birth, it becomes
apparent that its form is dependent upon many elements composing that
specific period.
Nationalism itself is relatively young when compared to man's co
habitation on this planet. The French Revolution marks the first great
presence of nationalism as a dynamic force. Before the period of the late
eighteenth century, a maturation process was taking place, nurturing
conditions which would make the emergence of nationalism possible. These
conditions were political, economic, and intellectual and continue even

3 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
1971) 18.
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today to fuel versions of nationalism.4. These conditions have historically
proven to be closely interconnected, reacting in both positive and negative
ways with one another while effecting peoples in equally diverse ways. With
the advent of nationalism, the masses were no longer in the nation-state,
but of the nation-state. 5
The birth of nationalism in the late eighteenth century cultivated
within the masses a desire for a nation-state. The nation-state owes its
existence to the birth of nationalism in the late eighteenth century and the
growth of the two concepts -- nationalism and the integration of the masses
into a common political form -- thus ran parallel to each other. Nationalism
became a driving force in man's aspir-ations for a nation-state. 6 The form of
nationalism bred by the French Revolution soon spread to all parts of the
globe, becoming one of the main currents of the nineteenth century and, in
the twentieth century became even a stronger force than religion as the main
contributor to the fall of the Hapsburg empire.7 Two World Wars, including
the dramatic growth of fascism in Europe at that time, were fueled by
nationalism and the subsequent Cold War likewise was born and died in part
because of nationalism and insistence upon the. sanctity of the nation-state
and the ideologies staunchly supported by these nation-states. It cannot be
denied that nationalism and the concept of the nation-state are forces which
have been "more important in shaping the history of Europe and the world

4 Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism(New York: MacMillan. 1960) 3.
5 lllliL., 20.
6 l.1lli1.., 4.
7 Joseph Roth, Romane "Der Radetzky Marsch" (Kaln : Verlag Kiepenhauer and
Witsch. 1984) 499.
"Die Zeit will uns nicht mehr! Diese Zeit will sich erst selbstiindige
Nationalstaaten schaffen! Man glaubt nie mehr an Gott. Die neue
Religion ist der Nationalisinus."

-
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in the last two centuries than the ideas of freedom and parliamentary
democracy or of

com~unism."8

Each version of nationalism in the last two centuries has possessed
different combinations of driving forces behind it. Historical climates and
events leave their signatures on each nation-state and varying nationalisms.
Lack of common specific elements, therefore, point to the possibility that
nationalism does not exist as a clearly defined entity. Instead, as it plays the
role of slave to history, reacting in no set way at each checkpoint, a
multitude of manifestations of nationalism exist. As Peter Alter states, "it is

.

more appropriate to speak of nationalisms in the plural than of nationalism
in the singular." 9 DifficultY in submitting an accurate definition of
nationalism, therefore rests on the fact that it is relevant to many factors
which vary from nation-state to nation-state. One must avoid ambiguity
while still incorporating elements which apply to each instance of
nationalism. Our definition of nationalism begins with the nation-state, for
it is a natural tendency of man to love his birthplace and all which it
embraces -- childhood, shared language, land, climate, history, and all else
that is familiar and comfortable. Historian and sociologist Eugen Lemberg
describes these elements as the nuclei around which a group's awareness of
its own location can crystallize, elements which "integrate the group and
demarcate its environment."lO
The actual, physical nation-state gives concreteness to man's
attachment to the native soil, the Heimat, and to man's kin and kind. ll It is

8 Peter Alter, Nationalismus (Frankfurt am Main : Suhrkampf Verlag. 1985) 4.

9 lllliL.. 5.
10 Eugen Lemberg, Nationalismus (Hamburg: Reinbek. 1964) 42.
11 Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, 18.
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therefore fully understandable that this natural tendency of man is a
prerequisite for nationalism as man will take pride in his land and be easily
swayed to believe in its superiority.l2 The nation-state becomes a vehicle for
man to translate his consciousness into deeds or organized action. According
to Hans Kohn, "nationalism demands the nation-state; the creation of the
nation-state strengthens nationalism. Here, as elsewhere in history, we find
a continuous interdependence and interaction."13 A core thus is formed for a
definition of nationalism -- the love which man has for his birthplace and the
nation-state as it is an active corporate will of the body which he loves.
It is no doubt easiest to gauge nationalism by how man expresses
nationalist feelings through the body 'and mechanisms of the nation-state.
Although manifestations of nationalisms are most easily observed at the
nation-state level, nationalism may be found at the level of the individual.
Also, nationalism need not always be dynamic as it can lie dormant as a state
of mind so long as it gives 'national' messages preferred status in social
communication and a greater weight in making decisions. In the opinion of
Karl Deutsch, a nationalist devotes greater attention to those concepts which
"carry specific symbols of nationality, or which originate from a specific
national source."14 Peter Alter also supports this view of nationalism as a
system of prioritization in which the nation-state receives indiscriminate
preference over all else. Alter, however, takes on perhaps a more extreme
stance in believing nationalism motivates peoples to totally disregard other
nations for the sacrosanct honor of their own nation. From this perspective,
nationalism glows in a negative light, suggesting an extreme ideology

12

lh.i.d....

4.

13 lJllil... 19.
14 Alter. NationalisIDus. 23.
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promoting xenophobia and racism. IS Thus, it becomes readily apparent that
nationalism as a mass movement with xenophobic tendencies can prove
harmful to the prospects of a harmonious union of states as such a definition
excludes from its purview all who do not belong to its own nation-state -- i.e.
the vast majority of the human race.l 6 Here it is important to note that the
character of nationalism does not always adopt a dark cloak of xenophobia,
but can be found as a state of mind receiving nourishment from hopes and
desires to seek the common good for the H eima t.
Theodor Schieder supports the view that nationalism need not be only

.

a mass movement but also a state of mind or ideology. In his definition,
nationalism is viewed as both a political movement and an ideology which
places the nations and the sovereign nation-state upon the highest pedestal as
crucial indwelling values. The reaction between ideology and political
movement is cafalyzed by nationalism. Schieder in this way considers
nationalism to be primarily a dynamic principle capable of "engendering
hopes, emotions, and action while contributing to a solidarity among
peoples for the purpose of achieving a common goal" for the nation-state.l 7
After important distinctions are drawn between nationalism as a
movement of the masses and nationalism as an ideology of the individual, a
skeleton of a definition of nationalism emerges. Nationalism results from
joining a human tendency to love the Heimat with an actual physical or, as
Benedict Anderson submits, "imagined", nation-state. This relationship of a
matrimonial nature provides the seed for nationalism -- a state of mind
which gives the utmost priority to matters and issues of the state. This
15 Ullil.., 24.
16 EJ. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (New York: Cambridge.
1990) 168.
17 Alter, Nationalismus, 8.
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relationship can adopt numerous outward appearances or it may lie dormant
within the individual as a content love of the homeland. Outward
manifestations can be noted in numerous ways, among them observations of
political and cultural activity. Manifestations of nationalism, then, give us
the most accurate measurements of nationalisms and it is from this
springboard that we will be catapulted into a comparison study of two present
versions of nationalisms -- that of a reunified Germany and that of Austria.
Such a comparison will furnish our thus far skeletal definition of
nationalism with muscle and tissue so that, at the conclusion of the study, a
clearly defined body shall emerge -- a body which will dictate the course of
events in Central Europe and carry the continent into the 21st century.

•
8

CHAPTER II
POST-REUNIFICATION GERMAN NATIONALISM

"The heavy doors click open and I look cautiously down the aisle of the
courtroom. A slim man dressed in black, the defendant, is in mid-sentence: '.
. . I am indeed a National Socialist, and I publicly acknowledge it. .. '"
Michael Schmidt, author of The New Reich, made the above
observation not in Munich circa 1924, nor at the Nuremburg Trials following
World War II, • but in Frankfurt am Main in 1989.1 Since that time, Germany
has seen a revival of its past which she has so hard tried to bury. Following
the Wiedervereinigung of 1989, a unified Germany has at times appeared to
be merely resuming its habits which were abruptly halted at the end of the
World War II by the splitting of Germany into two parts. Nazism, or neo
Nazism as the practice of xenophobic nationalism iscalled today, has
reappeared, giving rise to concerns in Germany, Europe, and the
international community. Neo-Nazism stands as a threat to any other form'
of German nationalism and thus deserves careful analysis if Germany is to
truly escape the vice grips of her past.

Public discussion of neo-Nazism in united Germany is marked by fear
of a growing, aggressive xenophobia, acceptance of violence against
foreigners, and, correspondingly, a growing number of perpetrators and
victims.2 Further public discussion arises over possible contributors to these
issues. Unemployment and unprecedented inflation, for example, have

1 Michael Schmidt, The New Reich (New York: Pantheon Books. 1993) 3.
2 Klaus J. Bade, "Immigration and Social Peace in United Germany," Daedelus: TournaI of the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences Winter 1994: 85.
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contributed to dissatisfaction and disillusionment among the united German

Valko People are not preoccupied with the issues of culture over more
traditional questions relating to economic growth because these issues are
seen to be related, creating political tensions of a kind not previously
addressed.3 As a timeline of neo-Nazism since the end of the cold war escorts
us through anti-foreigner violence in Hoyerswerda, Rostock, MolIn,
Solingen, and other German cities recently scarred by hate, it becomes
apparent that the causes of such violence must be sought and analyzed if an
assessment of the strength of right-wing nationalism in Germany is to be
found. Such an assessment will grant valuable insight into the direction
Germany will be taking on a nationalism spectrum with xenophobia on the
right and a more tolerant multi-nationalist spirit on the left.

Any society will resent an influx of strangers for which it is not
prepared. 4 As the cold war ended and waves of foreigners sought more
prosperous lives through Germany's liberal asylum laws, the two newly
joined lands of Germany began to experience economic hardships. The

Wirtschaftswunder guaranteed by Chancellor Helmut Kohl's soon yielded to
the cold reality of ballooning inflation and rising unemployment.(See Figure
1) With economic problems demanding increased attention, the new
Germany was not prepared for the number of asylum-seekers streaming
across her borders.

3 Daedelus Winter 1994: Preface.
4 Chaim Bermant, ''Pride and Prejudice in Germany," Chica&o Tribune 5 Sept. 1992, natL ed.,
sec. 1: 19.
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Euphoria over the economy emanated from Chancellor Kohl, who
forecasted aWirtschaftswunder in which economic integration of East and
West Germany would flow smoothly. Increases in taxation were ruled out by
Kohl as early as April 1990 as he pointed to the East German propensity to
consume and the universal German characteristic to work. s Within months,
however, Kohl's comments lost credibility when the President of the
Bundesbank, Karl Otto Pohl, resigned over vehement disagreement with the
economic policies towards reunification. 6

.

Unemployment in East and West Germany began to rise. Eastern
German firms became casualties of the transformation into a capitalist and
entrepreneurial economy while being surrounded by the chaos and
disintegration of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Nowhere was
this difficulty better exemplified than in Rostock, a Plain port of shipping
traffic through the Baltic. Along with the ruin of the Soviet Empire came a
fall in demand for Rostock's ships. At realistic pricing levels, Rostock's
quality products were uncompetitive in the West and the old market for the
ships, the Soviet Union, could no longer afford the prices. Businesses folded
and people lost jobs. No other work was available in Rostock and
unemployment rose by leaps and bounds, extending to well over 60%.7 Such
a situation echoed throughout eastern Germany as decrease in demand and
rising prices translated to high unemployment rates. West Germany even
began to see a rise in unemployment beginning in 1991. It soon became
apparent that Kohl's Wirtschaftswunder was only a mirage.
5 Ibid..6.
6 ''Pohl Grund fiir D-Mark," Siiddeutsche Zeitung 10 Dec. 1993. (Obtained through
LEXUS/NEXUS)
7 Bennant, "Pride and Prejudice in Germany".
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The unprecedented rises in unemployment contributed to increased
appeal of the neo-Nazis. With jobless totals of 2.26 million in West Germany
and 1.2 in East Germany, with 400,000 people on part-time employment
creation programs in the West and 1.7 million in the East, the Right found
itself in a promising environment. "Thus, in the first year of reunification
the seed was sown and xenophobia stood poised to reap the harvest. ttB

In Why Men Rebel by Ted Robert Gurr, an abstract model for perceived
justification for violence is submitted. Though it was proposed in 1960, the
model still holds true today. Gurr cites justifications for violence as being
effective "to the extent that"they make sense to disoriented people in terms of
their specific deprivations and their past experiences." In order to appeal to
groups who experience deprivation, specific ideas are required in identifying
the sources of deprivation and prescribing remedial action. 9 Such social
movements succeed in uniting members to the extent that the movements' '
appeals suggest solutions which are appropriate to the particular situations of
their audience.l 0 In Germany, the groups experiencing deprivation grew in
number as the unemployment rate climbed. A frustrated and discontented
public, according to Gurr's theory, would seek specific ideas in identifying
the sources of deprivation and prescribing remedial action. If such a specific
idea surfaced, and was perceived as plausible, the German peoples deprived of
jobs and subsequent livelihood would be moved to unite.

8 Ibid. ,8.
9 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1970) 202.
10 Hans Toch, The Social Psychology of Social Movements (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill, 1965)
13-19.
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An idea. specifying the sources of deprivation among unemployed and

dicontented people surfaced. The idea which made the greatest sense to the
discontented people in Germany was that the massive influx of foreigners
was the direct cause for the failure of the Wirtschaftswunder. With the
economy in trouble and no clear end in sight, widespread disenchantment
with politics found one of its major outlets in populist and extremist reaction
against uncontrolled immigration. ll Prior to the close of 1992, when the
coalition parties of the Christian Democratic Union, Christian Social Union,
and Free Democratic Party, as well as the major opposition party, the Social
Democrat Party, reached an agreement on legislation regulating political
asylum, emigration, and naturalization of foreigners in Germany, the
refugee law in Germany was perhaps the most liberal in the world.l 2 In
Figure 3, the massive increase in number of asylum seekers, or

Asylbewerber, iri Germany between 1987 and 1992 is shown. Under Article 16
of the German Federal Constitution, called Basic Law or Grundgesetz, all
persons who claimed to be politically persecuted were entitled to seek asylum
in Germany and remain until the case was settled -- a period generally lasting
two to three years. This Grundgesetz represented part of Germany's
atonement for racial persecution in the Third Reich. During this period, the

Asylbewerber were granted housing, food, schooling, medical care, and a
monthly check. Such policy bred resentment among taxpaying Germans and
even more so among the growing number of unemployed.l 3

11 "Germany:The Pressured Power," Forei&n PoliO' Summer 1993: 44.
12 Stephen Chapman, "A normal nation dogged by an abnormal history, " Chica&o Tribune 4
Oct. 1992, natl. ed., sec 1: 3.
13 .ILlli!... 3.
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During the 1980s the number of Asylbewerber in Germany fueled the
appeal of the extremist Right as such right-wing political parties as the

Nationale Partei Deutschlands increased in popularity. However, the
economy at that time was stable enough to the point where the Asylbewerber
were tolerated and the number of discontented Germans was relatively low.l 4
It was not until the reunification of Germany and the subsequent rise in

unemployment and inflation that the number of discontented voices became
significant enough to be heard. Enter the neo-Nazis and the xenophobic
Right, dark shadows of Germany's past.
"What do they want here? You know how they are. We should stuff
them in a package and send them back. They live better than us. We
pay for them and then they take our jobs away."lS
The quote comes from a neo-Nazi and reflects the perceived link
between the number of Asylbewerber in Germany and the frustration over
rising unemployment. In comparing Figures 1,2, and 3, a correlation
seemingly appears between the rise in the number of violent criminal acts
committed by right-wing extremists and the number of Asylbewerber .
Unemployment simultaneously displayed an upward trend, although it lags
a full year behind the clear rises in right-wing violence and Asylbewerber. It
therefore appears that, as public discontent grew, so too did the intensity of
xenophobic activity. If dissidents -- in this case, the unsatisfied Germans or
right-wing extremists -- don't feel their voices are being heard, they are likely
to use terrorist tactics to publicize their existence and objectives, widen

14 Dangers from the Right ?, 9.
.
15 "Lieber sterben als nach Sachsen," Der Spiegel 30 Sept. 1991: 31.
'Wat wollen die hier? Die kannste so, wie sie sind, in ein Paket schniiren und
wieder wegschicken. Die wohnen besser als wir. Wir bezahlen flir die, und dann
schnappen sie uns Deutschen noch die Jobs weg,"

•
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popular support by providing symbolic models for aggression, and by
demonstrating the regime's incapacity to provide protection, hoping
ultimately to overthrow it. l6 Such has been the case with the right-wing in
Germany. As the government displayed little commitment to addressing the
asylum problems, the right-wing provided symbolic models for aggression
through increased violence by neo-Nazis and skinheads and right-wing
political parties sought

mor~

support for reforming the government.

It was in' Hoyerswerda, a German town less than 50 miles from the

Polish border, in the autumn of 1991 that German xenophobia first burst in
the consciousness of a wider Federal Republic)7 Prior to that date, there was
little mention of xenophobia in German newspapers discussing the major
problems facing a unified Germany. 230 Asylbewerber were housed in
Hoyerswerda when neo-Nazi groups appeared:
"... shouting their hatred and their demand that Germany be made
"alien free," they attacked the hostel in which the foreigners were
housed. Their violence was premeditated, thorough, and sustained." l8
Rocks and Molotov cocktails were hurled through the windows as hundreds
of citizens stood idle in the streets without protesting. On-lookers even
cheered as the police appeared not to stop the violent neo-Nazis, but to ferry
away the asylum seekers. A shocked Germany asked herself why nothing was
done to directly confront the xenophobic neo-Nazis. The neo-Nazis appeared
to display more political self-confidence than ever before.l 9

16 Gurr, Why Men Rebel. 212.
17 Dan~rs from the Right? 12.
18~12.

19 Ibid..12.
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The events in Hoyerswerda were not isolated. Neo-Nazi attacks on
foreigners reappeared in Rostock throughout 1991 before peaking in August
of 1992 when several hundred neo-Nazis mounted a week-long campaign
against foreigners designed to instill fear and drive them out. A total of
nearly two thousand bystanders stood by and applauded. Xenophobic
violence had reached a level of fervor not seen in Germany since the days of
the Third Reich. The government, meanwhile, failed to display any resolve
on the matter outside of anti-racist lipservice. Helmut Kohl, on 27 August,
stated:
"those who threaten the lives and physical integrity of people, set
houses on fire and stir up hatrep. of foreigners must be punished with
the full severity permitted under our system of criminallaw."20
Following these comments, it was a full four months before any formal
action against the right-wing was taken by the coalition government. The
police continued to appear at riots, making token arrests while others
cheered. The criticisms of the lack of governmental action against the right
wing and the asylum issue mounted.

Democratic instability results in radical voting -- support for either the
radical right or left,21 While right-wing nationalist violence gained
momentum, so too did the right-wing political parties in Germany. It is
important to note, however, that the Verfassungsschutz, the major
government agency currently countering xenophobic activity in Germany,
has failed to produce evidence of overt collusion between the extremist
parliamentary parties and the neo-Nazi street groups.22 Under German law a

20 Hostility towards forei~1ers in Germany: Facts, analyses, arguments, 72. (A booklet
distributed by the Verfassungsschutz and obtainable through Goethe Institut, Chicago, IL) .
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party can only be banned if its leaders openly advocate violence; it is not
adequate grounds for banishment if they practice violence individually. Also,
the traditional symbols of Nazism such as the Hitler salute or the swastika are
strictly forbidden. As the right-wing political parties have thus far failed to
reveal a link to neo-Nazi violence, they have earned the nickname "the
respectable Right. "22

The two main right-wing parties in Germany are the Republikaner
and the Deutsche Volkunion (DVu). Both parties have granted immigration
the spotlight on their platforms, hoping to extend debate on the

Asylbewerber issue to a more profound and volkisch topic -- German
nationalism and identity. Both parties are publicly anti-foreigner,
campaigning under the warcry: "Germany for the Germans." At a time when
a reunified Germany struggles for resolutions conc~rning the foreigner issue,
the core issue of the right-wing has gone from peripheral to pivota1. 23

The Republikaner Party has thus far proven to be the more popular of
the two right-wing political parties in Germany. Led by former SS officer
Franz Schonhuber, the Republicans have repeatedly cited a "criminalization
of German history" -- the feeling that Germany should no longer be held
hostage by the guilt of her misdeeds during the Third Reich. As long as she is
made to feel guilty for the crimes of Adolf Hitler, they argue, she will never
take proper pride in her identity.24 It was this guilt, the Republikaner
21 Raymond M. Duch and James L. Gibson, "'Putting up with; Fascists in Western Europe: A
Comparitive, Cross-Level Analysis of Political Tolerance," The Western Political TournaI Fall
1993: 237.
22 Dan&ers from the Ri~ht? 21.
23.l1lliL 32.
24.l1lliL 28.
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maintained, which prevented Germany from administering proper attention
to the interests of Germans themselves and the seriousness of the foreigners
abusing Germany's liberal asylum laws.

In 1989, the Republikaners , though a member of the "respectable

right", a party with an anti-foreigner platform nonetheless, shocked Germany
by winning seats in the Berlin City Senate, obtaining 7.5% of the vote. Later
that year, Schonhuber's party gained 7.1 % and 6 seats in the European
Parliamentary elections -- a higher total than the stalwart parties of German
politics. In Bavaria, a traditional stronghold of National Socialists during the
Third Reich, the Republikaners garnered over 14% of the vote. The
reunification of 1989, however, initially translated to a set-back for the right
wing. However, they capitalized on the ever-increasing immigrant issue and
growing reluctahce toward the economy to make great gains again in 1992.25

In 1992, both right-wing parties experienced increased popularity while

confronting the central issues of a more powerful unified Germany -- a
Germany which in their opinion could be proud of her national identity. As
further discussion of the immigration issue spread closer to the dry
underbrush of neo-Nazism, the main ruling parties saw the need to take
action. Xenophobic fire threatened to spread unless the big parties could
persuade its sufferers that 1) Germany's borders were not an un-policed free
for-all, and 2) that keeping out all foreigners, even if at all possible, would
be wrong. 26

25 "Survey on Gennany," The Economist. 23 May 1992: 14.
26 Ibid.. 18.
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Government efforts to quash the rise of the radical Right adopted a
two-pronged attack. Chancellor Kohl brought the government's efforts to the
public's attention at a ,cabinet meeting on 2 December, 1992:
"In the past few days it (our constitutional democracy) has proved once
more that it is willing to use all the means at its disposal in combatting .
extremist violence and terror." 27

The offensive against xenophobia enlisted four working groups to compose a
mass effort by the Verfassungsschutz to coordinate all government action to

.

counter extremist violence and terror with the aid of departmental
secretaries. The Verfassungsschutz Advisory Groups covered problems
ranging from violence among young people to protective measures by police
and intelligence authorities. 28

The other prong of the government's attack on xenophobia attempted
to isolate the apparent core of the problem -- the issue of asylum. Germany's
liberal asylum laws were examined as right-wing, anti-foreigner violence
increased. This reconsideration of Article 16, Section 2 of the Basic Law was
initially seen as pandering to the right-wing groups, adding legitimacy to
their platforms. However, others argued that curbing the flow of

Asylbewerber would serve the obviously desirable purpose of defusing social
tensions. 29

The governing coalition and the Social Democrats reached a
compromise agreement in December of 1992 on new regulations on asylum.
27 Hostility towards foreilmers in Germany: Facts analyses, arguments. 21.
28 Ibid .. 22.
29 "Survey on Germany," The Economist: 9.

•
19
The new regulations still begin with the statement, "Politische Verfolgte

genieflen Asylrecht" ("persons prosecuted on political grounds shall enjoy
the right to asylum" ) and continue to add that persons from a member state
of the European Community, or from another "third state" which adheres to
the Geneva Convention or to the European Human Rights Convention, will
not have the right to asylum. In such cases where it is agreed one has no
right to apply for asylum based on the fact that the state is considered
"secure", officials have recourse to deportation, or aufenthaItsbeendede

Maflnahmen.

Since the government's main parties have cracked down on rightist
organizations and addressed the asylum issue, right wing violence has seen a
dramatic decrease. (See Figure 2) In January of 1994, the amount of right
wing violence <;:ontinued the downward trend, falling from 36,279 in January
of 1993 to only 13,154,30 At the same time, popularity of right-wing political
parties has at least for the meantime subsided, a fact which has relieved fears
among German politicians, considering 1994 is an election year. With the
"respectable Right" neutralized, it would seem some sort of correlation exists
between the fall of xenophobic violence and the measures taken by the
government. Such a correlation, when broadened, poses a more profound
question: Does right-wing nationalism in Germany rely upon foreigners as a
spark? If so, does the current trend mean that Germans, Europeans, and
other members of the international community can breathe a collective sigh
of relief?

These data do in fact seem to point to a direct connection between
right-wing nationalism in Germany and the influx of foreigners. However,
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caution must be practiced when attempting to draw such a conclusion. As
discussed in Chapter I, the concept of nationalism encompasses all which is
embraced in the Heimat -- childhood, shared language, land, climate,
history, culture, and all else that is familiar and comfortable to the native. 30
In gauging the effect of foreigners treading on the soil of the Heimat, one

must also consider the number and character of the the strangers, their
degree of strangeness, their concentration in anyone area, the rate of influx,
and above all the prevailing economic climate. 31 As the present economic
climate shows little sign of improving, this factor would not seem to playas
great a role as the former. Still, however, the fact that unemployment
continues to grow is reason for concetn when the factors which seemed to
lead to neo-Nazi violence in Rostock are considered.

The apparent correlation shown by the data is.in no way definite, as
numerous factors must be considered when debating the "German Question."
For example, does German reunification represent an attempted fusion of
two distinctly different identities -- that of the communist East and the
capitalist West -- or is it a rejoining of the Volk, or one distinct national
identity which merely took a 45 year hiatus? Germans of 1990 tended to view
reunification in the latter perspective, 73% of East Germans subscribing to the
idea of there being a single German identity. In 1993, following increased
discontent and instability, only 22% of West Germans and 11 % of East
Germans said they shared a common identity.32 Such statistics point at a

30 Eugen Lemberg, Nationalismus (Hamburg: Reinbek 1990).
31 Bermant,"Pride and Prejudice in Germany".
32 Anne-Marie Le Gloannec,"On German Identity," Daedelus:lournal of the American Academy
of Arts and Sciences Winter 1994: 142.
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present perception of the Wiedervereinigung as being little more than a legal
binding of two different peoples.

Germany has historically been situated at a crossroads between East and
West. In the twentieth century this geopolitical position translated to a
flashpoint between materialism, capitalism, and democracy of the West and
communism of the East. Right-wing nationalism seems to be more of a
natural defensive reaction to the end of the cold war than a renewal of the
Third Reich. Both real and imaginary threats fuel defensive reactions -- "and
a combination of international population movements with the ultra-rapid,
fundamental, and unprecedented socio-economic transformations so
characteristic of the third quarter of our century. "33 Nazism provides a
convenient means for right-wing groups to deal with discontent, as it
represents a unfted Germany's last great attempt to address these problems.

In analyzing German history and her various nationalisms, we
confront a profound discontinuity and its consequences. There has been a
crucial discontinuity of both state and nation in the German historical
experience and "this lack of unity ... is in fact the central problem of German
history"34 Discontinuity has again greatly affected Germany in the wake of the
cold war as ideological and human barriers dispelled euphoria. It is difficult
in Germany for people to give the utmost priority to a Heimat when two

Heimats exist, exacerbating the differences in ideology, history, and culture

33 E.]. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (New York: Cambridge University Press
1990): 165)
34 Dick Verheyen, The German Question (Boulder: Westview Press 1991): 14.
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of the last 45 years. This development, which has traversed a broad range of
opinion and objection, has resulted in intolerance and bigotry.35

When one reflects upon the concept of a unified German identity, the
mind immediately shifts to images of Adolf Hitler addressing throngs of
nationalistic Germans, or the extermination of millions of Jews at the hands .
of a culture in which nationalism had reached a point of fanatical racism.
Consequently, many "character analyses of Germany have focused on
Nazism and World War II and the pressures and emotions of war have often
had a clearly negative impact on their quality."36 A unified Germany
searching for a common identity thus bears a huge weight on her shoulders.
Other nations can behave selfishly or even stupidly without being suspected
of monstrous intentions, but Germany's history dooms it to relentless
scrutiny. "Tholigh there may be more neo-Nazis in Boise than Dresden, two
brownshirts in Germany will always inspire more alarm than 20 anywhere
else."37 This fear is justified when the shadow of Adolf Hitler leads neo-Nazis
to raids on asylum-seekers, but seems exaggerated in light of other
predominant nationalisms of today, the discontinuity of Germany's past, and
the walls which still divide Germany.
In 1960, Hans Kohn wrote:
"political nationalism under present conditions conflicts with the
main trends of human affairs, which is away from isolationism and
towards interdependence. The aim of right-wing nationalism is not
service and cooperation but exclusiveness and monopoly."38
35 David T. Zoud and Frank Zitka, "The walls that still divide Germany," The Chicago
Tribune 24 Sept. 1991 final ed., sec 2: 17.
36 Verheyen,The German Question: 14.
37 Chapman, "a normal nation dogged by an abnormal history," Chicago Tribune 4 Oct. 1992
nat!. ed., sec 1: 3.
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Today, a great stress is placed upon multi-lateral agreements and missions.
The UN adopts a greater global role than ever before and other agreements
such as GATT or Maastricht boldly state that no country can benefit from
isolationist polities. At the same time, there is constant evidence of the
possibly divisive nature of nationalism in such cases as secessionist
movements in the old nation-states of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. There
seem to be two contradictory trends in nationalism presently at work: one
encouraging integration and the other yearning for fragmentation of states.
These two forces are unfolding concurrently in Germany.3 9

Discontinuity has thus far discouraged Germans from embracing the
right-wing policies of her past. So long as different pasts, real or imagined,
linger in the German psyche, no single national identity will emerge. The
different pasts occupy center stage in the issue of why East and West are
distinctly different. 4o It is almost no matter that the political West German
identity, actually possessing political structure, is a stable one compared to
the the East German. 41 If it is left to East Germans to integrate into the West,
the Ossis will continue to feel alienated, being only observers in their
current social and cultural metamorphosis. 42 Alienation only breeds
resentment, bigotry, egoism, and ignorance -- all of which threaten the
successes reached through the reunification of Germany.

38 Hans Kohn,The Idea of Nationalism (Toronto: Collier Books 1960): 23.
39 Gidon Gottlieb, "Nations without States," Foreilm Affairs May/June 1994 vo1.73: 112.
40 Le Gloannec, "On German Identity," Daedelus: 142.
41 Ibid., 143.
42 Zoud and Zilka,"The walls that still divide Germany," The Chicago Tribune 24 Sept. 1991
final ed., sec 1:3.
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For an identity to emerge in a united Germany, all Germans will need
to share common pasts and a common goal. The lack of continuity in a
German state has created two distinct pasts which a unified Germany will
need to negotiate. On one hand, a unified Germany will need to share rather
than shun memories of the last unified German state. Secondly, a new , post

cold war past in which references to cold war Germany are not made will
need to be developed, for it was during the cold war when the two Germanys
grew apart and it will be in memories of the cold war that differences between
the two Germanys will be most apparent. Time will be a major requirement.
These pasts of both Germanys will need to be analyzed and reoriented toward
a democratic future. 43 Such a process' is already taking place; the German
government displayed resolve to this process of integration in its action
against a resurgence of Germany's neo-Nazi tendencies. Today, as right-wing
activities appear to be subsiding, the two Germanys may be overcoming the
first major test of the new Germany, preparing to focus her sights on one
German Identittit which is proving capable of dealing with resurgences of her
dark past. In Germany, such issues merit attention, for 'those who do not face
their past are bound to relive it.'44 Democracy and integration have been and
must continue to be the driving forces of Germany, forbidding a xenophobic
nationalism from taking root.

43 Le Gloannec, "On German Identity," Daedelus: 145.
44 Paraphrased from booklet distributed at Auschwitz Concentration Camp Memorial,
Oswiecem, Poland.
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CHAPTER III
A NEW AUSTRIAN IDENTITY?
Behind the State Opera House in Vienna and adjacent to the Hofburg
is the Albertinaplatz which exemplifies the Austrian question of nationalism.
The Hofburg is an icon of the glory days of Imperial Austria and the
Hapsburg Empire. On the Platz stands an upright slab of concrete upon
which names are engraved. The slab commemorates victims of racism and
anti-semitism -- dark shadows of Austria's past which includes the reduction
of the Jewish· population from 200,000 before World War II to mere hundreds
afterward: Only a few blocks Hom the monument, along the Kiirntnerstrafle ,
one can find the headquarters for the Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs (The
Freedom Party of Austria"), Austria's growing right-wing party. The setting
presents an appropriate contrast for a study of the "Austrian Question" of
nationalism. ;

Occupying a landmass slightly larger than the state of Massachusetts;
Austria is today a country lost among the massive change taking place around
her. The Soviet Union has crumbled, surrendering republics now struggling
to establish free-market economies while searching for national identities lost
during the regime. The road to West European Unity has unleashed potholes
and pratfalls as various nations struggle with domestic issues. Along the
southern fringe of Central Europe, a war rages on. Despite her small size and
neutral status, Austria's role should not be underestimated. Austria is in fact
an integral part of Western Europe, sharing its common political, economic,
and cultural principles. Furthermore, this small country will act as an
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outpost between Eastern and Western Europe in years to come, heavily
influencing the nature of the continent. 1

A man stands at the Albertinaplatz

distributing leaflets. The leaflet

does not demand a high level of intellect to understand. It pits two pictures
side by side with the apparent intention of drawing a parallel. The picture on
the left side is of a vandalized Jewish gravemarker during World War II.
Two letters, "55", and a swastika leave no doubt of the identity of the
perpetrators.of the crime. The picture on the right is also of a desecrated
Jewish Gtabstein, only the defacing spells out "Sieg Haider" ("Victory
Haider"). Framing the two pictures is the question, "1st das 1hr Ziel, Herr

Haider?" ("Is this your goal, Mr. Haider?")

"Austria," as the Freedom Party of Austria's (FPO's) National
Chairman, Jorg Haider, stated in his Vienna Statement oratory of 7 April,
1992, "is at the point of changing in a lasting way." This declaration, unlike
many of Haider's other statements, is indisputable. A main issue seems to be
whether Austria, a land with a reputation for being "tradition-bound, inert,
ossified, unwilling, and unable to move with the times," will be able to
sustain such a change. 2 With the end of the Cold War and the opening of
the borders between the financially stable West and impoverished East,
hundreds of thousands of immigrants have streamed into the countries of
Austria and Germany, applying for asylum. Such figures do not consider the
thousand of illegal immigrants who cross borders under cover of night. The

1 Barbara Jelavich, Modern Austria (New York: Cambride University Press 1987) 327.
2 Karl R. Stadler, Austria (New York: Praeger 1971) 1.
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immigrants, or Ausla'nder, seek a better way of life in a more prosperous and
stable society. 3

Residents of Austria have grown disgruntled over the decline of living
standards. Unemployment has reached unprecedented levels. (See Figure 4)
Jobs have become scarcer, housing problems have developed, and crime
rates have skyrocketed. The target of these frustrations, just as in Germany,
has become both the government and Ausla'nder, breathing life into anti
foreigner,

s~inhead,

and neo-Nazi movements to push the foreigners out.

"Ausla'ndef Raus!", a popular slogan of the Nazis during World War II, has

found a second life.

In Austria, the neo-Nazi movement has yet to evolve into as great a
problem as in:Germany; She has not experienced the same massive waves of
attacks against homes for Asylbewerber, Jewish memorials, and foreign
residents as in Germany.4 Nevertheless, there have been isolated acts of
racism. In the academic school year 1992-1993, the author personally
witnessed such acts and has been informed that such activity has not
subsided. Swastika graffiti can be found in streetcars, in the subways, and in
numerous other public sites. Children at Gymnasiums harass immigrant
children. Rallies against anti-foreigner violence are required to be supervised
by police in riot gear. In Eisenstadt on 1 November, 1992, a Jewish cemetery
was vandalized with gravemarkers being toppled and anti-foreigner messages
being painted. It has become apparent that the foreigner problem in Austria
stands a danger of escalating to the level of that in Germany if action is not
3 Dr. James Wilkie, Burden Sharing (Vienna: Federal Press Service 1991) 23. (Distributed by
the Austrian Press and Information Service, Washington, D.C.>
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soon taken. The FPO has attempted to seize this opportunity, and today
represents the voice of the right-wing in Austria.

The FPO has historically been among the weakest parties in Austrian
politics. Born from a group of almost a half-million ex-Nazis in 1949, the
party's traditional short-coming has been a vague platform irrelevant to
issues at hand in Austria. S From 19S6 to 1986, national election results
indicated only a snail's pace gain in popularity of the FPO while the two main
parties, the Sozialistische Partei Osterreichs (SPO) and the Osterreichische
Volkspartei (OVP), continued to share an overwhelming majority·6

During the early 1980s, while the FPO continued to flounder
nationally, a rising leader of the FPO found a firm base of support for a future
of the party. His name was Jorg Haider and he found popular support in
Carinthia, a Bundesland in southern Austria which shares borders with
Slovenia and Italy. The Carinthian power base, a Bundesland experiencirig
significant animosity towards minority Slovenians, provided firm footing
for a young Haider as he rose to national prominence by capturing a a large
portion of the vote. Haider's merciless tongue-lashing of what he described
as the "old parties", their "power monopoly", their "privilege economy",
their policies and (mal)practices, was in full accord with the current political
trend against the SPO? Haider garnered a majority of the popular vote in the
1984 Carinthian election via his "volkisch" nationalism while becoming an if
not controversial then popular figure by "exculpating ex-Nazi military figures
on the gro~nds that they had just done their military duty."8 With a new
policy which could potentially unite the FPO, Haider used his victory in

•
29
Carinthia as a springboard for his assault on the nation-wide FPO liberal
policies.

As Haider grew in popularity in the years following his victory in
Carinthia, so too did the entire FPO party. In 1986, Haider rose to the
National Chairmanship of the FPO through what has become known as the
"Haider Putsch". The years following the Putsch continued the trend of
increasing popularity within the FPO, as the party made giant strides in local
. elections. (See Figure 5) This success has ocurred at the cost of both the small
and grand coalitions composed of the SPO and OVP. In the national election
of 1991, the FPO more than doubled their previous representation at the
national level, earning 33 seats while the grand coalition continued to slide
toward political uncertainty.9

Just as the issue of immigration provides the right-wing parties of
Germany with a specific platform finally meriting national attention, the·
FPO benefits from the advent of extreme immigration problems faced by
Austria. Between 1981 and 1991 net foreign immigration totaled 270,000. At
the 1991 census there was a resident foreign population of 518,000 persons
without Austrian citizenship. This amounts to 6.6 percent of the total
Austrian population of 7.8 million in 1991. 10 Haider charges that foreigners
are cheating natives of jobs and apartments in Austria, where the global
economic recession has taken effect. This effect is most accurately reflected in
the growth in Austrian unemployment since 1990. (See Figure 4) The main
thrust of Haider's attacks on the issue of immigration took the form of the

Ausliinder Volksbegehren and became the focus of intense public controversy
since its conception.
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The Volksbegehren represented an attempt, as Haider stated in his
Viennese Statement, to:
"... create something in the way of human right to a homeland as a
corrective measure for the general freedom of movement, which is
guaranteed by the colorful palate of European languages and cultures."
The document outlined a method by which Haider felt Austria could best
deal with the problems of mass immigration over her borders. The

Volksbegehren aimed to address resulting problems facing Austrian society
such as houstng shortages, decline in the quality of education, corrupt
business practices, unemployment, and rising crime rates. Under the
Austrian Constitution, the Volksbegehren required 100,000 signatures if it
were to be placed on a ballot for public vote. Garnering the required amount
of signatures would have been a victory for Haider. The require 100,000
signatures were obtained and Austria at the close of 1992 stood poised for
debate on an issue which would give a clear indication of the future national
identity of Austria.

Haider envisioned the Volksbegehren as a mechanism to "equip an
open society with the moral strength to develop visions which will continue
the hallmarks of future political activities." ll Opponents of the

Volksbegehren saw it as a populist approach with an ultimate goal of fascist
totalitarianism. A campaign began in which the grand coalition and FPC>
argued their respective sides.

On 24 January, 1993 a crowd estimated at 250,000 gathered before the
Parliament building in Vienna to take part in Lichtermeer -- the "sea of
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light". The demonstration symbolized support for immigrants and foreign
refugees under attack from Haider's party platform and nee-Nazi violence.
The demonstration was part of a larger counter-movement formed in
solidarity by a group called "SOS-Mitmensch". SOS-Mitmensch received
strong support from political parties, the Catholic Church, and Austria's

Bundespriisident, Thomas Klestil. The movement greatly reduced support
for Haider's proposal. The Austrian Courts, meanwhile, dissolved many
extreme right-wing organizations and jailed a number of their leaders. 12 The
demonstration against the Volksbegehren translated to a humiliating failure
for Haider and the FPO.

The Volksbegehren . received only 1/2 of the 400,000 signatures
expected by Haider. It appeared to many as if it were the beginning of the end
for the FPO. The prospects for the party adopted a more dismal appearance in
March 1993, when the third-ranking officer of the party, Heide Schmidt, left
the party after publicly divulging her concern for ever-increasing rightist
tendencies within the party. Schmidt's departure reduced the number of FPO
seats from 33 to 28 as other dissatisfied FPOleaders followed her lead to a
newly-formed party, the Liberale Forum.1 3 As a further nail into the FPO
4 "Austrians show solidarity with Foreigners," Idaho State Tournai 24 Jan. 1993.
5 F. Parkinson, Conquering the Past: Austrian Nazism Yesterday and Today (Detroit: Wayne
State University Press. 1989) 260.
6 Meilenstein des Aufstiegs, 12-13. (Book released by the FPO - 1010 Vienna Austria,
Karntnerstra/5e 28)
7 Professor Adam Wandruszka, "The 'Third Force'," Austria Today Jan. 1992: 21.
8 Parkinson, Conquering the Past, 268.
9 Meilenstein des Aufstiegs. 15.
10 Austria and the New Migration, 168. (Distributed by the Austrian Federal Press Service,
Vienna 1990)
11 Jorg Haider, Wiener ErkHihrung. (Book released by the FPO)
12 "Country Report," Business International 12 Apr. 1993.
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coffin, the Federation of Austrian Industry cut financing to the FPC>. The
forecast for the FPC> suddenly became bleak, as Haider's influence on
domestic politics was expected to diminish.l 4

While the FPC> and J6rg Haider gained in popularity with the increase
in foreigners, debate proceeded within the coalition government in Austria
on how to deal with the problem. With a future wave of Ausla'nder expected
within S years, both from the former Soviet Union and overseas developing
countries, Austria stood little chance of controlling immigration without
adopting reform. Reform of Austria's immigration policies has taken the
form of a series of measures desigI1ed to keep immigration under control
while at the same time integrating foreigners at a rate acceptable to the
Austrian population. The first stage was the Federal Care Act of 1991,
followed by the new Asylum Act, which went into effect 1 June 1992 and was
a "major means of combatting abuse of the asylum procedure." Just as in
Germany, asylum seekers in Austria are entitled to housing, food,
schooling, and medical care until the application for asylum is processed.
Implemented on 1 January, 1993 the Foreigners Act regulates the entry and
residence of aliens. The fourth in the series of acts designed to better control
the influx of immigrants while also indirectly countering the FPC> was the

Non-Residence Act, entering into force on 1 July 1993, which "encompasses
all those persons who intend to make Austria the center of their lives
whether for occupational or residential reasons."lS It is worthwhile to note

13 "Alibi Weg: Der Ansprung seiner Stell vertreterin konnte Osterreichs Populisten ]org Haider
urn alle Kanzler-ehancen bringen," Der Spie~el June 1993: 141.
14 Business International:7.
15 Austria and the New Mi~ation. 169.
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here that the author has recited these laws as they were communicated to
him by the Austrian Consulate. There was no further clarification of the laws.

As reforms of the asylum laws have been implemented, the number of
asylum-seekers has declined. (See Figure 6) Such data would seem to
simultaneously lead to a fall in the popularity of the FPC> as well as the core of
their platform,' an anti-foreigner message. When the other hardships which
beset Haider and his party are also considered, it becomes astonishing that the
FPC> and, cGnsequently, right-wing nationalism in Austria continues to gain
momenttim. In local elections this past March (1994), the FPC> obtained 33%
of the vote in Carinthia, 20% in Salzburg, and 17% in Tirol. When
compared to the last local elections in these Bundesltinder in 1989, the FPC>
gained an average of 3%.1 6 Following on the heels of these victories, Haider
is preparing himself for a successful National Election this upcoming October.

Whether enough voters will warm to Haider's message in time for,
October is disputable. People are still attempting to decipher the political
messages which he delivers. Is the message of Haider a stark right-wing
message and, if so, should the public beware, lest they are in favor of a right
wing Austrian government? Or, is the message of Haider merely a liberal
attempt to cope with Austria's deteriorating situation? Physically, Haider
embodies a very appealing image to the public -- young, handsome,
charismatic, a great orator, and with a call to Austrians to have a love for
their homeland. 17 This call imparticular flows smoothly into Austrian's

16 "Austria: Austria's Election Results Detailed," Reuter Textline, 13 Mar. 1994.
17 Parkinson, Conquering the Past: 275.
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ears, ears which have lacked the sounds of nationalism, at least outward
nationalism, for some time.

Austrian history, just like German history, suffers from a great lack of
continuity. Her history is sliced into eras of varying characters, elements,
and, subsequently, nationalisms. Up until the fall of the Hapsburg Empire,
the Austrians had always maintained their status in the hub of the empire.
Austrians felt they were the core from which proceeded the formation of the
great power in Central Europe and, even more, of the great Hapsburg
empire. 18· Perhaps ironically, then, the Hapsburg empire fell partially as a
result of evolving nationalisms within its borders. In fact, it has long been
customary to look upon the Republic of Austria as the child of the Paris Peace
Conference and the Treaty of St. Germaine.l 9 World War I left in its wake a
small Austriart state in place of the once behemoth Hapsburg dynasty.
Economic woes beset Austria and the question of "Austrian history"
resurfaced time and again. Austria had no place in the world of,the interwar
period -- "Austrian history", as understood by the Austrians, consisted of
everything which took place in Central Europe between "antiquity and

th~

end of World War I in 1918."20

Austria emerged from the ruins of the once-mighty Hapsburg Empire
without an identity, falling deeper and deeper into depression while
struggling to pay war reparations. The terrible conditions after the war gave
rise to a conviction that Austria as an independent state was simply not
18 Fritz Fellner, "Introduction: The Genesis of the Austrian Republic," Modern Austria ( Palo
Alto: Society for the Promotion and Scholarship Inc. 1981): 1.
19 Stadler, Austria. 107.
20 Ibid .. 2.
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economically viable. Most Austrians renewed their pan-German feelings to
rally in support of a union with Germany "as an answer to their national
aspirations and harsh economic realities."21 The Interwar period came to a
close as the Nazis rose to power in Germany and declared the AnschlufJ, or
the incorporation of Austria into the Third Reich, with an Austria eager to
embrace a new identity. Euphoria died a painful death, however, as the

AnschlufJ drew Austria into a devastating war and subsequent crushing
defeat.

Posl World War II Austria suffered from a similar identity crisis as the
post World War I Austria. Vienna ,became known as 'four-in-a-boat' as the
four victorious powers occupied the city and the country. Little national
identity rooted itself in this era. However, the seeds were planted for the
Second Republic -- an era which has introduced Austria to hopes of a national
identity. The Allied powers opted not to penalize Austria for Nazi crimes,
concluding that National Socialism in Austria was "a dead horse whose
carrion would decompose in a natural manner."22 The carrion was declared
officially decomposed in 1955, when Austria signed the State Treaty,
receiving their small country in return for a declared neutrality.

Since the signing of the State Treaty, Austria has embarked on a search
for this 'national identity' which has proven elusive since the fall of the
Hapsburg Empire. She has prospered economically and today Vienna reigns
as an international crossroads between East and West. As Walter Maass

21 Jelavich, Modem Austria 326.
22 Walter B. Maass, Country Without a Name (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing 1979)
161.
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states, " The Austrians have learned to live and work together peacefully, but
among the older generation the past is still an agonizing subject and a source
of sometimes acrimonious discussion."23 A flashpoint is thus created in
which a yearning for an established national identity of old and a
dissatisfaction for the contemporary identity jostle eachother in a search for a
distinctly new identity. At the same time, the current identity, which
contrasts sharply with that of the old Hapsburg Empire in which Austria
wielded a major portion of the power, tip-toes over issues which perhaps
merit a non-peutral stance. This debate then returns us to such an issue -- the
issue of immigration.

Jorg Haider and the FPC> face the prospect of a sink-or-swim national
election this upcoming October. Should the FPC> perform well on its anti
foreigner, "Austria First" platform, the role of Austria will be that of a more
assertive, isolationist Republic. 24 Borders will be fortified, Austria herself
will form coalitions with other nations, and Austria will not have as strong a
campaign for European Union membership under a Haider-led
government. 25

If the National Election results in a voting trend back toward

the center, the SPC> and c>VP, Haider will have suffered an if not
insurmountable, then huge, set-back. As the number of Asylum seekers in
Austria continues to show a downward trend, Haider's platform may be
dissolving under his feet. Since the coalition parties favor EU membership,
an Austria would emerge from the election prepared for a more international

23 Ibid .. 158.
24 Translated from the 1993 FPO Slogan: "Osterreich Zuerst !"
25 "Osterreichische FreiheitIiche gegen den EU-Beitritt;Keine Empfehlung fur die
Volksabstimmung," Neue Zurcher Zeituns 11 April, 1994, Ausland sec.: 2.
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role, signaling a decrease in concern over issues upon which the FPC>
platform are based.

The National Election, however, should not be billed as a major
turning point for Austria, with the future of the small republic hanging in
the balance. The likely outcome of the election will see a public feeling more
comfortable with the immigration issue, but casting protest votes unless the
economy shows an improvement. Such a protest vote, in the author's
opinion will not result in a massive swing in seats in the national
government. However, it may send a firm message that Austrians are
prepared for a more assertive natiopal identity.
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